TY - GEN
T1 - A Game Theoretical Model for Optimal Distribution of Network Security Resources
AU - Ismail, Ziad
AU - Kiennert, Christophe
AU - Leneutre, Jean
AU - Chen, Lin
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017, Springer International Publishing AG.
PY - 2017/1/1
Y1 - 2017/1/1
N2 - Enforcing security in a network always comes with a tradeoff regarding budget constraints, entailing unavoidable choices for the deployment of security equipment over the network. Therefore, finding the optimal distribution of security resources to protect the network is necessary. In this paper, we focus on Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), which are among the main components used to secure networks. However, configuring and deploying IDSs efficiently to optimize attack detection and mitigation remain a challenging task. In particular, in networks providing critical services, optimal IDS deployment depends on the type of interdependencies that exists between vulnerable network equipment. In this paper, we present a game theoretical analysis for optimizing intrusion detection in such networks. First, we present a set of theoretical preliminary results for resource constrained network security games. Then, we formulate the problem of intrusion detection as a resource constrained network security game where interdependencies between equipment vulnerabilities are taken into account. Finally, we validate our model numerically via a real world case study.
AB - Enforcing security in a network always comes with a tradeoff regarding budget constraints, entailing unavoidable choices for the deployment of security equipment over the network. Therefore, finding the optimal distribution of security resources to protect the network is necessary. In this paper, we focus on Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), which are among the main components used to secure networks. However, configuring and deploying IDSs efficiently to optimize attack detection and mitigation remain a challenging task. In particular, in networks providing critical services, optimal IDS deployment depends on the type of interdependencies that exists between vulnerable network equipment. In this paper, we present a game theoretical analysis for optimizing intrusion detection in such networks. First, we present a set of theoretical preliminary results for resource constrained network security games. Then, we formulate the problem of intrusion detection as a resource constrained network security game where interdependencies between equipment vulnerabilities are taken into account. Finally, we validate our model numerically via a real world case study.
KW - Intrusion detection
KW - Non-cooperative game theory
KW - Optimization
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_13
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_13
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85032866440
SN - 9783319687100
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 234
EP - 255
BT - Decision and Game Theory for Security - 8th International Conference, GameSec 2017, Proceedings
A2 - Kiekintveld, Christopher
A2 - Schauer, Stefan
A2 - An, Bo
A2 - Rass, Stefan
A2 - Fang, Fei
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 8th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2017
Y2 - 23 October 2017 through 25 October 2017
ER -