Abstract
The communication infrastructure is a key element for management and control of the power system in the smart grid. The communication infrastructure, which can include equipment using off-the-shelf vulnerable operating systems, has the potential to increase the attack surface of the power system. The interdependency between the communication and the power system renders the management of the overall security risk a challenging task. In this paper, we address this issue by presenting a mathematical model for identifying and hardening the most critical communication equipment used in the power system. Using non-cooperative game theory, we model interactions between an attacker and a defender. We derive the minimum defense resources required and the optimal strategy of the defender that minimizes the risk on the power system. Finally, we evaluate the correctness and the efficiency of our model via a case study.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 7027420 |
| Pages (from-to) | 101-109 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Proceedings of IEEE International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering |
| Volume | 2015-January |
| Issue number | January |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 29 Jan 2015 |
| Event | 16th IEEE International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering, HASE 2015 - Daytona Beach, United States Duration: 8 Jan 2015 → 10 Jan 2015 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 7 Affordable and Clean Energy
Keywords
- Cyber-physical System
- Non-cooperative Game Theory
- SCADA Security
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