A note on Minimal Unanimity and Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatibility

Matías Núñez

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.12.001

A note on Minimal Unanimity and Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatibility

Matías Núñez

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Majumdar and Sen (Majumdar, D., Sen, A., 2004. Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible voting rules. Econometrica 72 (2), 523-540) extend the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem for Unanimous and Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible (OBIC) social choice functions, assuming independent beliefs. We introduce a new weakening concept for unanimity: the Minimal Unanimity. Even under this weaker condition, we get a negative result: the minimally unanimous social choice functions that are OBIC with respect to independent beliefs are dictatorial.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	209-211
Number of pages	3
Journal	Mathematical social sciences
Volume	53
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.12.001
Publication status	Published - 1 Mar 2007

Keywords

Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
Minimal Unanimity
Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatibility

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10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.12.001

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title = "A note on Minimal Unanimity and Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatibility",

abstract = "Majumdar and Sen (Majumdar, D., Sen, A., 2004. Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible voting rules. Econometrica 72 (2), 523-540) extend the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem for Unanimous and Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible (OBIC) social choice functions, assuming independent beliefs. We introduce a new weakening concept for unanimity: the Minimal Unanimity. Even under this weaker condition, we get a negative result: the minimally unanimous social choice functions that are OBIC with respect to independent beliefs are dictatorial.",

keywords = "Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, Minimal Unanimity, Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatibility",

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AB - Majumdar and Sen (Majumdar, D., Sen, A., 2004. Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible voting rules. Econometrica 72 (2), 523-540) extend the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem for Unanimous and Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible (OBIC) social choice functions, assuming independent beliefs. We introduce a new weakening concept for unanimity: the Minimal Unanimity. Even under this weaker condition, we get a negative result: the minimally unanimous social choice functions that are OBIC with respect to independent beliefs are dictatorial.

KW - Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

KW - Minimal Unanimity

KW - Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatibility

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DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.12.001

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JO - Mathematical social sciences

JF - Mathematical social sciences

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ER -

A note on Minimal Unanimity and Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatibility

Abstract

Keywords

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