A polynomial-time attack on the BBCRS scheme

  • Alain Couvreur
  • , Ayoub Otmani
  • , Jean Pierre Tillich
  • , Valérie Gauthier-Umaña

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

The BBCRS scheme is a variant of the McEliece public-key encryption scheme where the hiding phase is performed by taking the inverse of a matrix which is of the form T + R where T is a sparse matrix with average row/column weight equal to a very small quantity m, usually m < 2, and R is a matrix of small rank z ≥ 1. The rationale of this new transformation is the reintroduction of families of codes, like generalized Reed-Solomon codes, that are famously known for representin insecure choices. We present a key-recovery attack when z = 1 and m is chosen between 1 and 1+R+O(1/√n) where R denotes the code rate. This attack has complexity O(n6) and breaks all the parameters suggested in the literature.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPublic-Key Cryptography - PKC 2015 - 18th IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory in Public-Key Cryptography, Proceedings
EditorsJonathan Katz
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages175-193
Number of pages19
ISBN (Electronic)9783662464465
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2015
Event18th IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public-Key Cryptography, PKC 2015 - Gaithersburg, United States
Duration: 30 Mar 20151 Apr 2015

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume9020
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference18th IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public-Key Cryptography, PKC 2015
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityGaithersburg
Period30/03/151/04/15

Keywords

  • Code-based cryptography
  • Component-wise product of codes
  • Distinguisher
  • Generalized Reed-Solomon codes
  • Key-recovery

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