Advanced probabilistic couplings for differential privacy

  • Gilles Barthe
  • , Noémie Fong
  • , Marco Gaboardi
  • , Benjamin Grégoire
  • , Justin Hsu
  • , Pierre Yves Strub

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Differential privacy is a promising formal approach to data privacy, which provides a quantitative bound on the privacy cost of an algorithm that operates on sensitive information. Several tools have been developed for the formal verification of differentially private algorithms, including program logics and type systems. However, these tools do not capture fundamental techniques that have emerged in recent years, and cannot be used for reasoning about cutting-edge differentially private algorithms. Existing techniques fail to handle three broad classes of algorithms: 1) algorithms where privacy depends on accuracy guarantees, 2) algorithms that are analyzed with the advanced composition theorem, which shows slower growth in the privacy cost, 3) algorithms that interactively accept adaptive inputs. We address these limitations with a new formalism extending apRHL [6], a relational program logic that has been used for proving differential privacy of non-interactive algorithms, and incorporating aHL [11], a (non-relational) program logic for accuracy properties. We illustrate our approach through a single running example, which exemplifies the three classes of algorithms and explores new variants of the Sparse Vector technique, a well-studied algorithm from the privacy literature. We implement our logic in EasyCrypt, and formally verify privacy. We also introduce a novel coupling technique called optimal subset coupling that may be of independent interest.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCCS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages55-67
Number of pages13
ISBN (Electronic)9781450341394
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 24 Oct 2016
Externally publishedYes
Event23rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2016 - Vienna, Austria
Duration: 24 Oct 201628 Oct 2016

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Volume24-28-October-2016
ISSN (Print)1543-7221

Conference

Conference23rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2016
Country/TerritoryAustria
CityVienna
Period24/10/1628/10/16

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Advanced probabilistic couplings for differential privacy'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this