TY - JOUR
T1 - Advanced Smartphone-Based Identification of Transport Modes
T2 - Resilience under GNSS-Based Attacks
AU - Munoz Diaz, Estefania
AU - Rubio Hernan, Jose Manuel
AU - Jurado Romero, Francisco
AU - Karite, Aicha
AU - Vervisch-Picois, Alexandre
AU - Samama, Nel
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 by the authors.
PY - 2023/6/1
Y1 - 2023/6/1
N2 - One of the main challenges for ticketing in Mobility as a Service is the integration of the public and individual transport modes into a unified ticketing service. To realize this concept, a trustworthy identification of transport modes that is resilient to possible attacks is required. In this work, we propose two smartphone-based methods to seamlessly identify the use of trams, buses, subways, walking and bicycles, which are able to detect GNSS-based attacks and continue to provide a trustworthy identification of transport modes. We have recorded real-world measurements with commercial smartphones using the transport network in Munich and Paris. Our results show that it is possible to provide trustworthy identification of transport modes even when the system is under attack. In conclusion, in this work we demonstrate the vulnerability of smartphone-based ticketing to GNSS-based attacks, propose two methods to overcome this vulnerability and demonstrate the validity of our methods with real-world measurements.
AB - One of the main challenges for ticketing in Mobility as a Service is the integration of the public and individual transport modes into a unified ticketing service. To realize this concept, a trustworthy identification of transport modes that is resilient to possible attacks is required. In this work, we propose two smartphone-based methods to seamlessly identify the use of trams, buses, subways, walking and bicycles, which are able to detect GNSS-based attacks and continue to provide a trustworthy identification of transport modes. We have recorded real-world measurements with commercial smartphones using the transport network in Munich and Paris. Our results show that it is possible to provide trustworthy identification of transport modes even when the system is under attack. In conclusion, in this work we demonstrate the vulnerability of smartphone-based ticketing to GNSS-based attacks, propose two methods to overcome this vulnerability and demonstrate the validity of our methods with real-world measurements.
KW - MaaS
KW - e-ticketing
KW - smart mobility
KW - spoofing
U2 - 10.3390/futuretransp3020033
DO - 10.3390/futuretransp3020033
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85176566136
SN - 2673-7590
VL - 3
SP - 568
EP - 583
JO - Future Transportation
JF - Future Transportation
IS - 2
ER -