An advanced signature system for OLSR

Daniele Raffo; Cédric Adjih; Thomas Clausen; Paul Mühlethaler

doi:10.1145/1029102.1029106

An advanced signature system for OLSR

Daniele Raffo
, Cédric Adjih
, Thomas Clausen
, Paul Mühlethaler

INRIA Rocquencourt

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

In this paper we investigate security issues related to the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol - one example of a proactive routing protocol for MANETs. We inventory the possible attacks against the integrity of the OLSR network routing infrastructure, and present a technique for securing the network. In particular, assuming that a mechanism for routing message authentication (digital signatures) has been deployed, we concentrate on the problem where otherwise "trusted" nodes have been compromised by attackers, which could then inject false (however correctly signed) routing messages. Our main approach is based on authentication checks of information injected into the network, and reuse of this information by a node to prove its link state at a later time. We finally synthetize the overhead and the remaining vulnerabilities of the proposed solution.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery
Pages	10-16
Number of pages	7
ISBN (Print)	1581139721, 9781581139723
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/1029102.1029106
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2004
Externally published	Yes
Event	Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04 - Washington, DC, United States Duration: 25 Oct 2004 → 25 Oct 2004

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04

Conference

Conference	Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04
Country/Territory	United States
City	Washington, DC
Period	25/10/04 → 25/10/04

Keywords

ADVSIG
Link state
Multiple signatures
OLSR
Proactive
Proofs

Access to Document

10.1145/1029102.1029106

Cite this

Raffo, D., Adjih, C., Clausen, T., & Mühlethaler, P. (2004). An advanced signature system for OLSR. In Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04 (pp. 10-16). (Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04). Association for Computing Machinery. https://doi.org/10.1145/1029102.1029106

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title = "An advanced signature system for OLSR",

abstract = "In this paper we investigate security issues related to the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol - one example of a proactive routing protocol for MANETs. We inventory the possible attacks against the integrity of the OLSR network routing infrastructure, and present a technique for securing the network. In particular, assuming that a mechanism for routing message authentication (digital signatures) has been deployed, we concentrate on the problem where otherwise {"}trusted{"} nodes have been compromised by attackers, which could then inject false (however correctly signed) routing messages. Our main approach is based on authentication checks of information injected into the network, and reuse of this information by a node to prove its link state at a later time. We finally synthetize the overhead and the remaining vulnerabilities of the proposed solution.",

keywords = "ADVSIG, Link state, Multiple signatures, OLSR, Proactive, Proofs",

author = "Daniele Raffo and C{\'e}dric Adjih and Thomas Clausen and Paul M{\"u}hlethaler",

year = "2004",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1145/1029102.1029106",

language = "English",

isbn = "1581139721",

series = "Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04",

publisher = "Association for Computing Machinery",

pages = "10--16",

booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04",

note = "Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04 ; Conference date: 25-10-2004 Through 25-10-2004",

}

Raffo, D, Adjih, C, Clausen, T & Mühlethaler, P 2004, An advanced signature system for OLSR. in Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04. Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04, Association for Computing Machinery, pp. 10-16, Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04, Washington, DC, United States, 25/10/04. https://doi.org/10.1145/1029102.1029106

An advanced signature system for OLSR. / Raffo, Daniele; Adjih, Cédric; Clausen, Thomas et al.
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04. Association for Computing Machinery, 2004. p. 10-16 (Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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T1 - An advanced signature system for OLSR

AU - Raffo, Daniele

AU - Adjih, Cédric

AU - Clausen, Thomas

AU - Mühlethaler, Paul

PY - 2004/1/1

Y1 - 2004/1/1

N2 - In this paper we investigate security issues related to the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol - one example of a proactive routing protocol for MANETs. We inventory the possible attacks against the integrity of the OLSR network routing infrastructure, and present a technique for securing the network. In particular, assuming that a mechanism for routing message authentication (digital signatures) has been deployed, we concentrate on the problem where otherwise "trusted" nodes have been compromised by attackers, which could then inject false (however correctly signed) routing messages. Our main approach is based on authentication checks of information injected into the network, and reuse of this information by a node to prove its link state at a later time. We finally synthetize the overhead and the remaining vulnerabilities of the proposed solution.

AB - In this paper we investigate security issues related to the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol - one example of a proactive routing protocol for MANETs. We inventory the possible attacks against the integrity of the OLSR network routing infrastructure, and present a technique for securing the network. In particular, assuming that a mechanism for routing message authentication (digital signatures) has been deployed, we concentrate on the problem where otherwise "trusted" nodes have been compromised by attackers, which could then inject false (however correctly signed) routing messages. Our main approach is based on authentication checks of information injected into the network, and reuse of this information by a node to prove its link state at a later time. We finally synthetize the overhead and the remaining vulnerabilities of the proposed solution.

KW - ADVSIG

KW - Link state

KW - Multiple signatures

KW - OLSR

KW - Proactive

KW - Proofs

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DO - 10.1145/1029102.1029106

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:14844323027

SN - 1581139721

SN - 9781581139723

T3 - Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04

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EP - 16

BT - Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04

PB - Association for Computing Machinery

T2 - Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, SASN'04

Y2 - 25 October 2004 through 25 October 2004

ER -

An advanced signature system for OLSR

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Keywords

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