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An Information-Theoretic Model for Side-Channel Attacks in Embedded Hardware

  • Éloi De Chérisey
  • , Sylvain Guilley
  • , Olivier Rioul
  • , Pablo Piantanida
  • CNRS LTCI
  • Secure-IC SAS
  • L2S, CNRS, Univ Paris-Sud

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Using information-theoretic tools, this paper establishes a mathematical link between the probability of success of a side-channel attack and the minimum number of queries to reach a given success rate, valid for any possible distinguishing rule and with the best possible knowledge on the attacker's side. This link is a lower bound on the number of queries, which depends on the mutual information between the traces and the secret key. This leads us to derive upper bounds on the mutual information that are as tight as possible and can be easily calculated. It turns out that, in the case of additive white Gaussian noise, the bound on the probability of success of any attack is directly related to the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). This leads to easy computations and predictions of the success rate for any leakage model.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2019 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2019 - Proceedings
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages310-314
Number of pages5
ISBN (Electronic)9781538692912
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2019
Externally publishedYes
Event2019 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2019 - Paris, France
Duration: 7 Jul 201912 Jul 2019

Publication series

NameIEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings
Volume2019-July
ISSN (Print)2157-8095

Conference

Conference2019 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2019
Country/TerritoryFrance
CityParis
Period7/07/1912/07/19

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