Bargaining through Approval

Matías Núñez; Jean François Laslier

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.015

Bargaining through Approval

Matías Núñez
, Jean François Laslier

Université de Cergy-Pontoise
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first proves the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargaining method ensures that both players obtain at least their mean utility level in equilibrium. Finally it proves that, provided that the players are partially honest, the mechanism triggers sincerity and ensures that no alternative Pareto dominates the outcome of the game.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	63-73
Number of pages	11
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	60
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.015
Publication status	Published - 1 Oct 2015
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Approval Voting
Efficiency
Partial honesty
Two-agents

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10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.015

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title = "Bargaining through Approval",

abstract = "The paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first proves the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargaining method ensures that both players obtain at least their mean utility level in equilibrium. Finally it proves that, provided that the players are partially honest, the mechanism triggers sincerity and ensures that no alternative Pareto dominates the outcome of the game.",

keywords = "Approval Voting, Efficiency, Partial honesty, Two-agents",

author = "Mat{\'i}as N{\'u}{\~n}ez and Laslier, \{Jean Fran{\c c}ois\}",

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AB - The paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first proves the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargaining method ensures that both players obtain at least their mean utility level in equilibrium. Finally it proves that, provided that the players are partially honest, the mechanism triggers sincerity and ensures that no alternative Pareto dominates the outcome of the game.

KW - Approval Voting

KW - Efficiency

KW - Partial honesty

KW - Two-agents

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DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.015

M3 - Article

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JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

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ER -

Bargaining through Approval

Abstract

Keywords

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