Abstract
We compare the optimal insurance contribution rate and welfare levels for two opposite social insurance systems: a beveridgean one and a bismarckian one. The social contribution rates are decided by majority voting rule in both cases. In a model where agents earn heterogeneous incomes, we determine which system is preferred by which class of agents. Classification JEL : D7, H5.
| Translated title of the contribution | Beveridge or bismarck, what consequences on welfare of heterogeneous agents? |
|---|---|
| Original language | French |
| Pages (from-to) | 541-550 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Revue Economique |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Dec 2003 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Fingerprint
Dive into the research topics of 'Beveridge or bismarck, what consequences on welfare of heterogeneous agents?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Cite this
- APA
- Author
- BIBTEX
- Harvard
- Standard
- RIS
- Vancouver