TY - JOUR
T1 - Bidding Efficiently in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions With Incomplete Information Using Monte Carlo Tree Search and Determinization
AU - Pacaud, Alexandre
AU - Bechler, Aurelien
AU - Coupechoux, Marceau
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 IEEE.
PY - 2025/1/1
Y1 - 2025/1/1
N2 - In this article, we tackle the problem of designing an efficient bidding strategy for simultaneous ascending auctions (SAA). SAA is a well-known mechanism for allocating spectrum to mobile networks operators and has been used for example to allocate 5G licenses in many countries. Although the rules are relatively simple, there is no known optimal bidding strategy for SAA. In a previous work, we proposed a Simultaneous move Monte Carlo Tree Search-based algorithm named SMSα that we extend here to an incomplete information framework. We consider and compare three determinization approaches of SMSα, and show how they are able to tackle four key strategic issues of SAA, namely, the exposure problem, the own price effect, the budget constraints and the eligibility management. Extensive numerical experiments on instances of realistic size and including an uncertain framework show that our extensions of SMSα outperform state-of-the-art algorithms by achieving higher expected utility while taking less risks.
AB - In this article, we tackle the problem of designing an efficient bidding strategy for simultaneous ascending auctions (SAA). SAA is a well-known mechanism for allocating spectrum to mobile networks operators and has been used for example to allocate 5G licenses in many countries. Although the rules are relatively simple, there is no known optimal bidding strategy for SAA. In a previous work, we proposed a Simultaneous move Monte Carlo Tree Search-based algorithm named SMSα that we extend here to an incomplete information framework. We consider and compare three determinization approaches of SMSα, and show how they are able to tackle four key strategic issues of SAA, namely, the exposure problem, the own price effect, the budget constraints and the eligibility management. Extensive numerical experiments on instances of realistic size and including an uncertain framework show that our extensions of SMSα outperform state-of-the-art algorithms by achieving higher expected utility while taking less risks.
KW - Ascending auctions
KW - determinization
KW - exposure
KW - own price effect
KW - risk-aversion
KW - simultaneous move Monte Carlo tree search (SM-MCTS)
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105000556078
U2 - 10.1109/TG.2025.3552025
DO - 10.1109/TG.2025.3552025
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:105000556078
SN - 2475-1502
VL - 17
SP - 813
EP - 826
JO - IEEE Transactions on Games
JF - IEEE Transactions on Games
IS - 3
ER -