TY - GEN
T1 - Coalitional Game-Theoretical Approach to Coinvestment with Application to Edge Computing
AU - Patanè, Rosario
AU - Araldo, Andrea
AU - Chahed, Tijani
AU - Kiedanski, Diego
AU - Kofman, Daniel
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 IEEE.
PY - 2023/1/1
Y1 - 2023/1/1
N2 - We propose in this paper a coinvestment plan between several stakeholders of different types, namely a physical network owner, operating network nodes, e.g. a network operator or a tower company, and a set of service providers willing to use these resources to provide services as video streaming, augmented reality, autonomous driving assistance, etc. One such scenario is that of deployment of Edge Computing resources. Indeed, although the latter technology is ready, the high Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) cost of such resources is the barrier to its deployment. For this reason, a solid economical framework to guide the investment and the returns of the stakeholders is key to solve this issue. We formalize the coinvestment framework using coalitional game theory. We provide a solution to calculate how to divide the profits and costs among the stakeholders, taking into account their characteristics: traffic load, revenues, utility function. We prove that it is always possible to form the grand coalition composed of all the stakeholders, by showing that our game is convex. We derive the payoff of the stakeholders using the Shapley value concept, and elaborate on some properties of our game. We show our solution in simulation.
AB - We propose in this paper a coinvestment plan between several stakeholders of different types, namely a physical network owner, operating network nodes, e.g. a network operator or a tower company, and a set of service providers willing to use these resources to provide services as video streaming, augmented reality, autonomous driving assistance, etc. One such scenario is that of deployment of Edge Computing resources. Indeed, although the latter technology is ready, the high Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) cost of such resources is the barrier to its deployment. For this reason, a solid economical framework to guide the investment and the returns of the stakeholders is key to solve this issue. We formalize the coinvestment framework using coalitional game theory. We provide a solution to calculate how to divide the profits and costs among the stakeholders, taking into account their characteristics: traffic load, revenues, utility function. We prove that it is always possible to form the grand coalition composed of all the stakeholders, by showing that our game is convex. We derive the payoff of the stakeholders using the Shapley value concept, and elaborate on some properties of our game. We show our solution in simulation.
KW - Coalitional game theory
KW - Coinvestment
KW - Edge computing
KW - Multi-tenancy
KW - Shapley
U2 - 10.1109/CCNC51644.2023.10060093
DO - 10.1109/CCNC51644.2023.10060093
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85150644869
T3 - Proceedings - IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC
SP - 517
EP - 522
BT - 2023 IEEE 20th Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2023
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 20th IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2023
Y2 - 8 January 2023 through 11 January 2023
ER -