Abstract
The new Bank of Israel Law of 2010 changed monetary policy decision-making at the Bank of Israel from a setup where decisions are taken by the governor to one where decisions are taken by a committee of voting members. We use this institutional change as a natural experiment to compare individual versus collective decision-making. Empirical results show different dynamics for interest rate decisions across the two regimes and support the view that the status quo bias is larger when decisions are taken by a committee than when they are taken by a single individual.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 73-89 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | European Economic Review |
| Volume | 93 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Apr 2017 |
Keywords
- Committees
- Political economy of central banking
- Voting models
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