Competition policy for health care provision in France

Philippe Choné

doi:10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.11.015

Competition policy for health care provision in France

Philippe Choné

ENSAE

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

There are more than two thousand hospitals in France, about equally divided between government-owned and privately-owned hospitals. Activity-based payment, which has been generalized in 2008 for acute care hospitals, has raised competition issues as DRG tariffs differ according to ownership status. Furthermore, the payment rule has been criticized for preventing the realization of potential hospital synergies, and as a result a recent reform has mandated close cooperation between public hospitals. The physician market is dual, with most GPs being subject to fee regulation and many self-employed, private-practice, specialist doctors being allowed to set their prices freely. Government regulation and centralized negotiations have traditionally been preferred to market mechanisms in this industry.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	111-118
Number of pages	8
Journal	Health Policy
Volume	121
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.11.015
Publication status	Published - 1 Feb 2017
Externally published	Yes

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 3 Good Health and Well-being

Keywords

Cooperation agreements
Hospitals
Merger control
Physician competition

Access to Document

10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.11.015

Cite this

@article{9616fbf6fd984e3280160c16997a6753,

title = "Competition policy for health care provision in France",

abstract = "There are more than two thousand hospitals in France, about equally divided between government-owned and privately-owned hospitals. Activity-based payment, which has been generalized in 2008 for acute care hospitals, has raised competition issues as DRG tariffs differ according to ownership status. Furthermore, the payment rule has been criticized for preventing the realization of potential hospital synergies, and as a result a recent reform has mandated close cooperation between public hospitals. The physician market is dual, with most GPs being subject to fee regulation and many self-employed, private-practice, specialist doctors being allowed to set their prices freely. Government regulation and centralized negotiations have traditionally been preferred to market mechanisms in this industry.",

keywords = "Cooperation agreements, Hospitals, Merger control, Physician competition",

author = "Philippe Chon{\'e}",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2016 Elsevier Ireland Ltd",

year = "2017",

month = feb,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.11.015",

language = "English",

volume = "121",

pages = "111--118",

journal = "Health Policy",

issn = "0168-8510",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Competition policy for health care provision in France

AU - Choné, Philippe

PY - 2017/2/1

Y1 - 2017/2/1

N2 - There are more than two thousand hospitals in France, about equally divided between government-owned and privately-owned hospitals. Activity-based payment, which has been generalized in 2008 for acute care hospitals, has raised competition issues as DRG tariffs differ according to ownership status. Furthermore, the payment rule has been criticized for preventing the realization of potential hospital synergies, and as a result a recent reform has mandated close cooperation between public hospitals. The physician market is dual, with most GPs being subject to fee regulation and many self-employed, private-practice, specialist doctors being allowed to set their prices freely. Government regulation and centralized negotiations have traditionally been preferred to market mechanisms in this industry.

AB - There are more than two thousand hospitals in France, about equally divided between government-owned and privately-owned hospitals. Activity-based payment, which has been generalized in 2008 for acute care hospitals, has raised competition issues as DRG tariffs differ according to ownership status. Furthermore, the payment rule has been criticized for preventing the realization of potential hospital synergies, and as a result a recent reform has mandated close cooperation between public hospitals. The physician market is dual, with most GPs being subject to fee regulation and many self-employed, private-practice, specialist doctors being allowed to set their prices freely. Government regulation and centralized negotiations have traditionally been preferred to market mechanisms in this industry.

KW - Cooperation agreements

KW - Hospitals

KW - Merger control

KW - Physician competition

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85007603344

U2 - 10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.11.015

DO - 10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.11.015

M3 - Article

C2 - 27993434

AN - SCOPUS:85007603344

SN - 0168-8510

VL - 121

SP - 111

EP - 118

JO - Health Policy

JF - Health Policy

IS - 2

ER -

Competition policy for health care provision in France

Abstract

UN SDGs

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this