Computer-aided verification for mechanism design

  • Gilles Barthe
  • , Marco Gaboardi
  • , Emilio Jesús Gallego Arias
  • , Justin Hsu
  • , Aaron Roth
  • , Pierre Yves Strub

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We explore techniques from computer-aided verification to construct formal proofs of incentive properties. Because formal proofs can be automatically checked, agents do not need to manually check the properties, or even understand the proof. To demonstrate, we present the verification of a sophisticated mechanism: the generic reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design to algorithm design given by Hartline, Kleinberg, and Malekian. This mechanism presents new challenges for formal verification, including essential use of randomness from both the execution of the mechanism and from the prior type distributions.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationWeb and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, WINE 2016, Proceedings
EditorsAdrian Vetta, Yang Cai
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages279-293
Number of pages15
ISBN (Print)9783662541098
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2016
Externally publishedYes
Event12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2016 - Montreal, Canada
Duration: 11 Jun 201614 Jul 2016

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume10123 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2016
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityMontreal
Period11/06/1614/07/16

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