Core stable algorithms for coalition games with complementarities and peer effects

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In this short paper, we show two new algorithms for finding stable structures in ordinal coalition potential games. The first one is anytime and enumerative. It performs on a graph. The second one is a modified Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) using counter-proposals. It finds a many-to-one matching. We illustrate with the example of video caching from a content creator's servers to a service provider's servers.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)72-75
Number of pages4
JournalPerformance Evaluation Review
Volume43
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2015

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