TY - GEN
T1 - Dissecting demand response mechanisms
T2 - 2016 American Control Conference, ACC 2016
AU - Benegiamo, Alberto
AU - Loiseau, Patrick
AU - Neglia, Giovanni
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 American Automatic Control Council (AACC).
PY - 2016/7/28
Y1 - 2016/7/28
N2 - Demand-Response (DR) programs, whereby users of an electricity network are encouraged by economic incentives to re-arrange their consumption in order to reduce production costs, are envisioned to be a key feature of the smart grid paradigm. Several recent works proposed DR mechanisms and used analytical models to derive optimal incentives. Most of these works, however, rely on a macroscopic description of the population that does not model individual choices of users. In this paper, we conduct a detailed analysis of those models and we argue that the macroscopic descriptions hide important assumptions that can jeopardize the mechanisms' implementation (such as the ability to make personalized offers and to perfectly estimate the demand that is moved from a timeslot to another). Then, we start from a microscopic description that explicitly models each user's decision. We introduce four DR mechanisms with various assumptions on the provider's capabilities. Contrarily to previous studies, we find that the optimization problems that result from our mechanisms are complex and can be solved numerically only through a heuristic. We present numerical simulations that compare the different mechanisms and their sensitivity to forecast errors. At a high level, our results show that the performance of DR mechanisms under reasonable assumptions on the provider's capabilities are significantly lower than those suggested by previous studies, but that the gap reduces when the population's flexibility increases.
AB - Demand-Response (DR) programs, whereby users of an electricity network are encouraged by economic incentives to re-arrange their consumption in order to reduce production costs, are envisioned to be a key feature of the smart grid paradigm. Several recent works proposed DR mechanisms and used analytical models to derive optimal incentives. Most of these works, however, rely on a macroscopic description of the population that does not model individual choices of users. In this paper, we conduct a detailed analysis of those models and we argue that the macroscopic descriptions hide important assumptions that can jeopardize the mechanisms' implementation (such as the ability to make personalized offers and to perfectly estimate the demand that is moved from a timeslot to another). Then, we start from a microscopic description that explicitly models each user's decision. We introduce four DR mechanisms with various assumptions on the provider's capabilities. Contrarily to previous studies, we find that the optimization problems that result from our mechanisms are complex and can be solved numerically only through a heuristic. We present numerical simulations that compare the different mechanisms and their sensitivity to forecast errors. At a high level, our results show that the performance of DR mechanisms under reasonable assumptions on the provider's capabilities are significantly lower than those suggested by previous studies, but that the gap reduces when the population's flexibility increases.
U2 - 10.1109/ACC.2016.7525414
DO - 10.1109/ACC.2016.7525414
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84992154496
T3 - Proceedings of the American Control Conference
SP - 3225
EP - 3230
BT - 2016 American Control Conference, ACC 2016
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 6 July 2016 through 8 July 2016
ER -