Dissent in monetary policy decisions

Alessandro Riboni; Francisco Ruge-Murcia

doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.03.006

Dissent in monetary policy decisions

Alessandro Riboni
, Francisco Ruge-Murcia

McGill University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Voting records indicate that dissents in monetary policy committees are frequent and predictability regressions show that they help forecast future policy decisions. This paper develops a model of consensual collective decision-making and dissent, and estimates it using individual voting data from the Bank of England and the Riksbank. Regressions based on artificial data simulated from the model show that decision-making frictions help account for the predictive power of current dissents.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	137-154
Number of pages	18
Journal	Journal of Monetary Economics
Volume	66
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.03.006
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2014

Keywords

Committees
Political economy of central banking
Supermajority
Voting models

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10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.03.006

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title = "Dissent in monetary policy decisions",

abstract = "Voting records indicate that dissents in monetary policy committees are frequent and predictability regressions show that they help forecast future policy decisions. This paper develops a model of consensual collective decision-making and dissent, and estimates it using individual voting data from the Bank of England and the Riksbank. Regressions based on artificial data simulated from the model show that decision-making frictions help account for the predictive power of current dissents.",

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AB - Voting records indicate that dissents in monetary policy committees are frequent and predictability regressions show that they help forecast future policy decisions. This paper develops a model of consensual collective decision-making and dissent, and estimates it using individual voting data from the Bank of England and the Riksbank. Regressions based on artificial data simulated from the model show that decision-making frictions help account for the predictive power of current dissents.

KW - Committees

KW - Political economy of central banking

KW - Supermajority

KW - Voting models

U2 - 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.03.006

DO - 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.03.006

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84905159485

SN - 0304-3932

VL - 66

SP - 137

EP - 154

JO - Journal of Monetary Economics

JF - Journal of Monetary Economics

ER -

Dissent in monetary policy decisions

Abstract

Keywords

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