Dynamic Pricing with Finitely Many Unknown Valuations

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

Abstract

Motivated by posted price auctions where buyers are grouped in an unknown number of latent types characterized by their private values for the good on sale, we investigate regret minimization in stochastic dynamic pricing when the distribution of buyers’ private values is supported on an unknown set of points in [0, 1] of unknown cardinality K.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)247-273
Number of pages27
JournalProceedings of Machine Learning Research
Volume98
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2019
Externally publishedYes
Event30th International Conference on Algorithmic Learning Theory, ALT 2019 - Chicago, United States
Duration: 22 Mar 201924 Mar 2019

Keywords

  • Posted price auction
  • dynamic pricing
  • multiarmed bandits
  • regret minimization

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