Inequality-averse principal, exogenous budget, and second-best public-goods provision

Pierre C. Boyer

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.037

Inequality-averse principal, exogenous budget, and second-best public-goods provision

Pierre C. Boyer

University of Mannheim

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We characterize the second-best public-goods provision rule with an inequality-averse principal. Our main results show how the provision rule reacts to variations of an exogenous budget available for public-goods provision when the principal exhibits different levels of inequality aversion.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	61-63
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	127
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.037
Publication status	Published - 1 Feb 2015
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Comparative statics
Public-goods provision
Utilitarian welfare maximization

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10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.037

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title = "Inequality-averse principal, exogenous budget, and second-best public-goods provision",

abstract = "We characterize the second-best public-goods provision rule with an inequality-averse principal. Our main results show how the provision rule reacts to variations of an exogenous budget available for public-goods provision when the principal exhibits different levels of inequality aversion.",

keywords = "Comparative statics, Public-goods provision, Utilitarian welfare maximization",

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AB - We characterize the second-best public-goods provision rule with an inequality-averse principal. Our main results show how the provision rule reacts to variations of an exogenous budget available for public-goods provision when the principal exhibits different levels of inequality aversion.

KW - Comparative statics

KW - Public-goods provision

KW - Utilitarian welfare maximization

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DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.037

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VL - 127

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EP - 63

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -

Inequality-averse principal, exogenous budget, and second-best public-goods provision

Abstract

Keywords

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