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Insurance law and incomplete contracts

  • AgroParisTech INRA
  • ENSAE

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyze how insurance law can mitigate moral hazard by allowing insurers to reduce or cancel coverage in some circumstances. We consider an incomplete contract setting in which the insurer may obtain information related to the policyholder's behavior through a costly audit of the circumstances of the loss. Court decisions are based on a standard of proof such as the balance of probabilities. We show that an optimal insurance law brings efficiency gains compared to the no-audit case. We also highlight the conditions under which the burden of proof should be on the insured, provided that insurers are threatened with sanctions for bad faith.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1253-1286
Number of pages34
JournalRAND Journal of Economics
Volume51
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2020
Externally publishedYes

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