Mind-changes at the FOMC

Alessandro Riboni; Francisco Ruge-Murcia

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108565

Mind-changes at the FOMC

Alessandro Riboni
, Francisco Ruge-Murcia

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper develops a model of committee decision-making where members of different expertise deliberate and share private information prior to voting. The model predicts that members truthfully reveal their private information and are willing to “change their minds” as a result of deliberation. The predictions of the model are evaluated using data from the Federal Open Market Committee.

Original language	English
Article number	108565
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	184
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108565
Publication status	Published - 1 Nov 2019

Keywords

Collective decision-making
FOMC
Greenbooks
Monetary policy
U.S. Federal Reserve

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10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108565

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title = "Mind-changes at the FOMC",

abstract = "This paper develops a model of committee decision-making where members of different expertise deliberate and share private information prior to voting. The model predicts that members truthfully reveal their private information and are willing to “change their minds” as a result of deliberation. The predictions of the model are evaluated using data from the Federal Open Market Committee.",

keywords = "Collective decision-making, FOMC, Greenbooks, Monetary policy, U.S. Federal Reserve",

author = "Alessandro Riboni and Francisco Ruge-Murcia",

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KW - Greenbooks

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Mind-changes at the FOMC

Abstract

Keywords

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