TY - JOUR
T1 - Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences
T2 - two characterizations of the crawler
AU - Tamura, Yuki
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2022/11/1
Y1 - 2022/11/1
N2 - In object reallocation problems, if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, TTC is the leading rule: It is the only rule satisfying efficiency, the endowment lower bound, and strategy-proofness. However, on the subdomain of single-peaked preferences, Bade (J Econ Theory 180:81–99, 2019) defines a new rule, the “crawler”, which also satisfies these properties, and in fact enjoys a stronger strategic property. We identify additional interesting properties that the crawler satisfies, and provide two characterizations of this rule. The first characterization is based on the endowment lower bound and two invariance properties, “adjacent-endowment-swapping invariance” and “separability”. The second characterization is based on the endowment lower bound, strategy-proofness, adjacent-endowment-swapping invariance, and another invariance property, “non-bossiness”.
AB - In object reallocation problems, if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, TTC is the leading rule: It is the only rule satisfying efficiency, the endowment lower bound, and strategy-proofness. However, on the subdomain of single-peaked preferences, Bade (J Econ Theory 180:81–99, 2019) defines a new rule, the “crawler”, which also satisfies these properties, and in fact enjoys a stronger strategic property. We identify additional interesting properties that the crawler satisfies, and provide two characterizations of this rule. The first characterization is based on the endowment lower bound and two invariance properties, “adjacent-endowment-swapping invariance” and “separability”. The second characterization is based on the endowment lower bound, strategy-proofness, adjacent-endowment-swapping invariance, and another invariance property, “non-bossiness”.
U2 - 10.1007/s00182-022-00803-6
DO - 10.1007/s00182-022-00803-6
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85126302854
SN - 0020-7276
VL - 51
SP - 537
EP - 565
JO - International Journal of Game Theory
JF - International Journal of Game Theory
IS - 3-4
ER -