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On the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in group formation games

  • CNRS

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a class of games of group formation. The use of potentials allows for a characterization of such an equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)283-287
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume66
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2000
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • C72
  • D62
  • H73
  • Nash equilibrium, Potential games

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