Optimal rationing within a heterogeneous population

Philippe Choné; Stéphane Gauthier

doi:10.1111/jpet.12220

Optimal rationing within a heterogeneous population

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

A government agency delegates to a provider (hospital, medical gatekeeper, school, social worker) the decision to supply a service or treatment to individual recipients. The agency does not perfectly know the distribution of individual treatment costs in the population. The single-crossing property is not satisfied when the uncertainty pertains to the dispersion of the distribution. We find that the provision of service should be distorted upward when the first-best efficient number of recipients is sufficiently high.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	732-738
Number of pages	7
Journal	Journal of Public Economic Theory
Volume	19
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12220
Publication status	Published - 1 Jun 2017
Externally published	Yes

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title = "Optimal rationing within a heterogeneous population",

abstract = "A government agency delegates to a provider (hospital, medical gatekeeper, school, social worker) the decision to supply a service or treatment to individual recipients. The agency does not perfectly know the distribution of individual treatment costs in the population. The single-crossing property is not satisfied when the uncertainty pertains to the dispersion of the distribution. We find that the provision of service should be distorted upward when the first-best efficient number of recipients is sufficiently high.",

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Optimal rationing within a heterogeneous population

Abstract

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