Optimal Strategy Against Straightforward Bidding in Clock Auctions

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We study a model of auction representative of the 5G auction in France. We determine the optimal strategy of a bidder, assuming that the valuations of competitors are unknown to this bidder and that competitors adopt the straightforward bidding strategy. Our model is based on a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP). We show in particular that this special POMDP admits a concise statistics, avoiding the solution of a dynamic programming equation in the space of beliefs. We illustrate our results by numerical experiments, comparing the value of the bidder with the value of a perfectly informed one.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationNetwork Games, Artificial Intelligence, Control and Optimization - 11th International Conference, NETGCOOP 2024, Proceedings
EditorsHélène Le Cadre, Yezekael Hayel, Bruno Tuffin, Tijani Chahed
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Pages83-93
Number of pages11
ISBN (Print)9783031785993
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2025
Event11th International Conference on Network Games, Artificial Intelligence, Control and Optimization, NETGCOOP 2024 - Lille, France
Duration: 9 Oct 202411 Oct 2024

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume15185 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference11th International Conference on Network Games, Artificial Intelligence, Control and Optimization, NETGCOOP 2024
Country/TerritoryFrance
CityLille
Period9/10/2411/10/24

Keywords

  • Auction
  • Bidding Strategy
  • Optimal Control
  • POMDP

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