Public communication with externalities

Georgy Lukyanov; Konstantin Shamruk; Tong Su; Ahmed Wakrim

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.003

Public communication with externalities

Georgy Lukyanov
, Konstantin Shamruk
, Tong Su
, Ahmed Wakrim

Toulouse School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper develops a model in which a sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender's information. It is shown that aggregate payoff externalities create an endogenous conflict of interests between the sender and the receivers, rendering full information revelation, in general infeasible. We demonstrate that an exogenous bias in the sender's preferences can improve public information provision and raise welfare. Two applications of the setup are discussed.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	177-196
Number of pages	20
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	136
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.003
Publication status	Published - 1 Nov 2022

Keywords

Communication
Externalities
Optimal bias
Public information

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10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.003

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abstract = "This paper develops a model in which a sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender's information. It is shown that aggregate payoff externalities create an endogenous conflict of interests between the sender and the receivers, rendering full information revelation, in general infeasible. We demonstrate that an exogenous bias in the sender's preferences can improve public information provision and raise welfare. Two applications of the setup are discussed.",

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AU - Shamruk, Konstantin

AU - Su, Tong

AU - Wakrim, Ahmed

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N2 - This paper develops a model in which a sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender's information. It is shown that aggregate payoff externalities create an endogenous conflict of interests between the sender and the receivers, rendering full information revelation, in general infeasible. We demonstrate that an exogenous bias in the sender's preferences can improve public information provision and raise welfare. Two applications of the setup are discussed.

AB - This paper develops a model in which a sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender's information. It is shown that aggregate payoff externalities create an endogenous conflict of interests between the sender and the receivers, rendering full information revelation, in general infeasible. We demonstrate that an exogenous bias in the sender's preferences can improve public information provision and raise welfare. Two applications of the setup are discussed.

KW - Communication

KW - Externalities

KW - Optimal bias

KW - Public information

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85138792060

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DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.003

M3 - Article

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SN - 0899-8256

VL - 136

SP - 177

EP - 196

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -

Public communication with externalities

Abstract

Keywords

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