Reasoning about natural strategic ability

Wojciech Jamroga, Vadim Malvone, Aniello Murano

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

In game theory, as well as in the semantics of game logics, a strategy can be represented by any function from states of the game to the agent's actions. That makes sense from the mathematical point of view, but not necessarily in the context of human behavior. This is because humans are quite bad at executing complex plans, and also rather unlikely to come up with such plans in the first place. In this paper, we adopt the view of bounded rationality, and look only at "simple" strategies in specifications of agents' abilities. We formally define what "simple" means, and propose a variant of alternating-Time temporal logic that takes only such strategies into account. We also study the model checking problem for the resulting semantics of ability.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017
EditorsSanmay Das, Edmund Durfee, Kate Larson, Michael Winikoff
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages714-722
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9781510855076
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2017
Externally publishedYes
Event16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017 - Sao Paulo, Brazil
Duration: 8 May 201712 May 2017

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume2
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Conference

Conference16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017
Country/TerritoryBrazil
CitySao Paulo
Period8/05/1712/05/17

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