Regulatory capture and banking supervision reform

Pierre C. Boyer; Jorge Ponce

doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2011.07.002

Regulatory capture and banking supervision reform

Pierre C. Boyer
, Jorge Ponce

University of Mannheim
Banco Central del Uruguay

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We analyze whether banking supervision responsibilities should be concentrated in the hands of a single supervisor. We find that splitting supervisory powers among different supervisors is a superior arrangement in terms of social welfare to concentrating them in a single supervisor when the capture of supervisors by bankers is a concern. This result has implications for the design of banking supervisory architecture and informs current reform efforts in this field.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	206-217
Number of pages	12
Journal	Journal of Financial Stability
Volume	8
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2011.07.002
Publication status	Published - 1 Sept 2012
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Banking supervision reform
Financial supervision architecture
Prudential supervision
Regulatory capture

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10.1016/j.jfs.2011.07.002

Cite this

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abstract = "We analyze whether banking supervision responsibilities should be concentrated in the hands of a single supervisor. We find that splitting supervisory powers among different supervisors is a superior arrangement in terms of social welfare to concentrating them in a single supervisor when the capture of supervisors by bankers is a concern. This result has implications for the design of banking supervisory architecture and informs current reform efforts in this field.",

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Regulatory capture and banking supervision reform

Abstract

Keywords

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