Safety Demonstration for a Rail Signaling Application in Nominal and Degraded Modes Using Formal Proof

Jean Marc Mota, Evguenia Dmitrieva, Amel Mammar, Paul Caspi, Salimeh Behnia, Nicolas Breton, Pascal Raymond

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

This chapter presents the proof process used by Thales and Autonomous Operator of Parisian Transports (RATP) to demonstrate the safety of the signaling systems used for the RATP network in Paris. It introduces the rail application concerned by the author's proof activities, the Thales system used for the metro. The chapter then presents the models used in the formal proof process, before describing the proof suite designed by Prover Technology. The results of application of the proof process to the Thales signaling system for RATP line are described and discussed in detail, before considering a number of potential improvements. The chapter presents a brief overview of the architecture of the PMI system. It discusses the computerized interlocking module (CIM) subsystem, which constitutes the operational core of the signaling system.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationFormal Methods Applied to Industrial Complex Systems
PublisherWiley-Blackwell
Pages71-113
Number of pages43
Volume9781848216327
ISBN (Electronic)9781119004707
ISBN (Print)9781848216327
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 29 Sept 2014

Keywords

  • Autonomous Operator of Parisian Transports (RATP)
  • Computerized interlocking module (CIM)
  • Formal proof process
  • PMI system
  • Prover Technology
  • Rail signaling systems
  • Safety demonstration
  • Thales

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Safety Demonstration for a Rail Signaling Application in Nominal and Degraded Modes Using Formal Proof'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this