Abstract
We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal tradeoff for the team between optimization of stage payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 413-424 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Mathematics of Operations Research |
| Volume | 32 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2007 |
Keywords
- Entropy
- Min-max values
- Repeated games
- Secret correlation
- Signals
- Stochastic process
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