Self-selection in tournaments: The case of chess players

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We consider a simple tournament model in which individuals auto-select into the contest on the basis of their commonly known strength levels, and privately observed strength-shocks (reflecting temporary deviations from observed levels). The model predicts that the participation rate should increase with the player's observed strength, and the total awarded prize amount. Furthermore, under certain conditions self-selection implies that participants with high observed strength levels have smaller expected strength-shocks than those with low levels. Consequently, the latter should play better than predicted and the former worse (given their observed strength). These predictions are confronted with data from a large and high-prize chess tournament held in the USA. This tournament is divided into different sections, with players being able to play in the section to which their current chess rating (observed strength) belongs. As predicted, we find that within each section the participation probability increases with chess rating and prize amounts, and players with a relatively low (resp. high) rating are indeed the ones who have a better (resp. worse) relative performance.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)213-234
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume126
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2016
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Chess
  • Prizes
  • Relative performance
  • Selection
  • Sorting
  • Tournament

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