Abstract
We introduce entropy techniques to study the classical reputation model in which a long-run player faces a series of short-run players. The long-run player's actions are possibly imperfectly observed. We derive explicit lower and upper bounds on the equilibrium payoffs to the long-run player.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1627-1641 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Econometrica |
| Volume | 79 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Sept 2011 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Incomplete information
- Relative entropy
- Repeated games
- Reputation
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