Social insurance with representative democracy

Stéphane Rossignol; Emmanuelle Taugourdeau

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2003.09.012

Social insurance with representative democracy

Stéphane Rossignol
, Emmanuelle Taugourdeau

Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)
Université Versailles-Saint Quentin

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In a representative democracy model we determine the preferred social insurance system. We show that it corresponds to that which implies the lowest contribution rate when the risk aversion is high.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	127-134
Number of pages	8
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	82
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2003.09.012
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2004
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Representative democracy
Social insurance

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10.1016/j.econlet.2003.09.012

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title = "Social insurance with representative democracy",

abstract = "In a representative democracy model we determine the preferred social insurance system. We show that it corresponds to that which implies the lowest contribution rate when the risk aversion is high.",

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DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2003.09.012

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SN - 0165-1765

VL - 82

SP - 127

EP - 134

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 1

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Social insurance with representative democracy

Abstract

Keywords

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