Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped

Bas Dietzenbacher; Yuki Tamura

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111293

Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped

Bas Dietzenbacher
, Yuki Tamura

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Imagine a group of agents, each being endowed with a share of one unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity. Each agent has single-dipped preferences. We characterize the Pareto optimal allocations that satisfy individual rationality or coalitional rationality. In particular, we show that Pareto optimal and individually rational allocations always exist, and we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core.

Original language	English
Article number	111293
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	231
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111293
Publication status	Published - 1 Oct 2023
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Pareto optimality
core
resource reallocation
single-dipped preferences

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10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111293

Cite this

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AB - Imagine a group of agents, each being endowed with a share of one unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity. Each agent has single-dipped preferences. We characterize the Pareto optimal allocations that satisfy individual rationality or coalitional rationality. In particular, we show that Pareto optimal and individually rational allocations always exist, and we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core.

KW - Pareto optimality

KW - core

KW - resource reallocation

KW - single-dipped preferences

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85168455374

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111293

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111293

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SN - 0165-1765

VL - 231

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

M1 - 111293

ER -

Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped

Abstract

Keywords

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