Stop-and-go agricultural policies

Jean Marc Bourgeon; Robert G. Chambers

doi:10.1111/0002-9092.00001

Stop-and-go agricultural policies

Jean Marc Bourgeon
, Robert G. Chambers

Université Paris-Nanterre
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics
University of Maryland, College Park

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The optimal design of farm policy and public investment in agriculture in the presence of asymmetric information between the government and farmers is studied. It is shown that a mix of capped deficiency payments and voluntary paid land diversion can implement the optimal policy outcome. Optimal program design requires large farmers to farm all their land, and small farmers may or may not divert acreage. Decoupled policies are never optimal.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-13
Number of pages	13
Journal	American Journal of Agricultural Economics
Volume	82
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/0002-9092.00001
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2000
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Agricultural policy
Asymmetric information
Decoupled payments
Public investment in research

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10.1111/0002-9092.00001

Cite this

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AB - The optimal design of farm policy and public investment in agriculture in the presence of asymmetric information between the government and farmers is studied. It is shown that a mix of capped deficiency payments and voluntary paid land diversion can implement the optimal policy outcome. Optimal program design requires large farmers to farm all their land, and small farmers may or may not divert acreage. Decoupled policies are never optimal.

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KW - Asymmetric information

KW - Decoupled payments

KW - Public investment in research

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Stop-and-go agricultural policies

Abstract

Keywords

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