Strategic learning in games with symmetric information

Olivier Gossner; Nicolas Vieille

doi:10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3

Strategic learning in games with symmetric information

Olivier Gossner
, Nicolas Vieille

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

Abstract

This article studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponents'. We chararacterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an exploration phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	25-47
Number of pages	23
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	42
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2003
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Bandit problems
Games with incomplete information
Public value of information

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10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3

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title = "Strategic learning in games with symmetric information",

abstract = "This article studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponents'. We chararacterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an exploration phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase.",

keywords = "Bandit problems, Games with incomplete information, Public value of information",

author = "Olivier Gossner and Nicolas Vieille",

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doi = "10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3",

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AU - Gossner, Olivier

AU - Vieille, Nicolas

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AB - This article studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponents'. We chararacterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an exploration phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase.

KW - Bandit problems

KW - Games with incomplete information

KW - Public value of information

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0038405035

U2 - 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3

DO - 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3

M3 - Review article

AN - SCOPUS:0038405035

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 42

SP - 25

EP - 47

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

IS - 1

ER -

Strategic learning in games with symmetric information

Abstract

Keywords

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