Strengthening incentives for truth-telling in Majority voting

Margarita Kirneva; Matías Núñez

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2026.106168

Strengthening incentives for truth-telling in Majority voting

Margarita Kirneva
, Matías Núñez

CUNEF Universidad

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

All currently known mechanisms that fully implement Majority rule are either infinite (integer games) or rely on off-equilibrium transfers. We propose a finite mechanism with no transfers, called Bloc formation, that achieves this goal in pure and mixed strategies. It increases the set of instances where any agent is pivotal by relying on off-equilibrium lotteries, and thus, incentivizes truth-telling.

Original language	English
Article number	106168
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	234
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2026.106168
Publication status	Published - 1 May 2026

Keywords

Complete information
Majority voting
Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
Nash implementation

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10.1016/j.jet.2026.106168

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abstract = "All currently known mechanisms that fully implement Majority rule are either infinite (integer games) or rely on off-equilibrium transfers. We propose a finite mechanism with no transfers, called Bloc formation, that achieves this goal in pure and mixed strategies. It increases the set of instances where any agent is pivotal by relying on off-equilibrium lotteries, and thus, incentivizes truth-telling.",

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KW - Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium

KW - Nash implementation

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Strengthening incentives for truth-telling in Majority voting

Abstract

Keywords

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