TY - JOUR
T1 - The Role of Electoral Incentives for Policy Innovation
T2 - Evidence from the US Welfare Reform
AU - Bernecker, Andreas
AU - Boyer, Pierre C.
AU - Gathmann, Christina
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021,American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. All Rights Reserved.
PY - 2021/5/1
Y1 - 2021/5/1
N2 - How do governors’ reelection motives affect policy experimentation? We develop a theoretical model of this situation, and then test the predictions in data on US state-level welfare reforms from 1978 to 2007. This period marked the most dramatic shift in social policy since the New Deal. Our findings indicate that governors with strong electoral support are less likely to experiment than governors with little support. Yet, governors who cannot be reelected actually experiment more than governors striving for reelection. These findings are robust to controlling for ideology, preferences for redistribution, the state legislature, and cross-state learning.
AB - How do governors’ reelection motives affect policy experimentation? We develop a theoretical model of this situation, and then test the predictions in data on US state-level welfare reforms from 1978 to 2007. This period marked the most dramatic shift in social policy since the New Deal. Our findings indicate that governors with strong electoral support are less likely to experiment than governors with little support. Yet, governors who cannot be reelected actually experiment more than governors striving for reelection. These findings are robust to controlling for ideology, preferences for redistribution, the state legislature, and cross-state learning.
U2 - 10.1257/pol.20190690
DO - 10.1257/pol.20190690
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85125059478
SN - 1945-7731
VL - 13
SP - 26
EP - 57
JO - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
JF - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
IS - 2
ER -