Skip to main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content

Utility/Privacy Trade-off through the lens of Optimal Transport

  • ENS Paris-Saclay

Research output: Contribution to journal › Conference article › peer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Strategic information is valuable either by remaining private (for instance if it is sensitive) or, on the other hand, by being used publicly to increase some utility. These two objectives are antagonistic and leaking this information might be more rewarding than concealing it. Unlike classical solutions that focus on the first point, we consider instead agents that optimize a natural trade-off between both objectives. We formalize this as an optimization problem where the objective mapping is regularized by the amount of information revealed to the adversary (measured as a divergence between the prior and posterior on the private knowledge). Quite surprisingly, when combined with the entropic regularization, the Sinkhorn loss naturally emerges in the optimization objective, making it efficiently solvable. We apply these techniques to preserve some privacy in online repeated auctions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)591-601
Number of pages11
JournalProceedings of Machine Learning Research
Volume108
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2020
Event23rd International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, AISTATS 2020 - Virtual, Online
Duration: 26 Aug 2020 → 28 Aug 2020

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Utility/Privacy Trade-off through the lens of Optimal Transport'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this