A repeated interactions model of tax competition

Roberto Cardarelli; Emmanuelle Taugourdeau; Jean Pierre Vidal

doi:10.1111/1467-9779.00086

A repeated interactions model of tax competition

Roberto Cardarelli
, Emmanuelle Taugourdeau
, Jean Pierre Vidal

International Monetary Fund
Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)
CNRS

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal › Article › Revue par des pairs

Résumé

Models of tax competition usually assume a single-period framework. This paper sets up a repeated interactions model of tax competition and establishes conditions under which fiscal policy harmonization can result from repeated interactions between governments. It is shown that fiscal policy harmonization cannot prevail when regional asymmetries are too strong. In such a case, the only way to achieve fiscal policy harmonization is to set up a central fiscal authority.

langue originale	Anglais
Pages (de - à)	19-38
Nombre de pages	20
journal	Journal of Public Economic Theory
Volume	4
Numéro de publication	1
Les DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9779.00086
état	Publié - 1 déc. 2002
Modification externe	Oui

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10.1111/1467-9779.00086

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abstract = "Models of tax competition usually assume a single-period framework. This paper sets up a repeated interactions model of tax competition and establishes conditions under which fiscal policy harmonization can result from repeated interactions between governments. It is shown that fiscal policy harmonization cannot prevail when regional asymmetries are too strong. In such a case, the only way to achieve fiscal policy harmonization is to set up a central fiscal authority.",

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AB - Models of tax competition usually assume a single-period framework. This paper sets up a repeated interactions model of tax competition and establishes conditions under which fiscal policy harmonization can result from repeated interactions between governments. It is shown that fiscal policy harmonization cannot prevail when regional asymmetries are too strong. In such a case, the only way to achieve fiscal policy harmonization is to set up a central fiscal authority.

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A repeated interactions model of tax competition

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