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Advanced probabilistic couplings for differential privacy

  • Gilles Barthe
  • , Noémie Fong
  • , Marco Gaboardi
  • , Benjamin Grégoire
  • , Justin Hsu
  • , Pierre Yves Strub
  • IMDEA Software Institute
  • PSL research University & IPSL
  • University at Buffalo, The State University of New York
  • INRIA
  • University of Pennsylvania

Résultats de recherche: Le chapitre dans un livre, un rapport, une anthologie ou une collectionContribution à une conférenceRevue par des pairs

52 Citations (Scopus)

Résumé

Differential privacy is a promising formal approach to data privacy, which provides a quantitative bound on the privacy cost of an algorithm that operates on sensitive information. Several tools have been developed for the formal verification of differentially private algorithms, including program logics and type systems. However, these tools do not capture fundamental techniques that have emerged in recent years, and cannot be used for reasoning about cutting-edge differentially private algorithms. Existing techniques fail to handle three broad classes of algorithms: 1) algorithms where privacy depends on accuracy guarantees, 2) algorithms that are analyzed with the advanced composition theorem, which shows slower growth in the privacy cost, 3) algorithms that interactively accept adaptive inputs. We address these limitations with a new formalism extending apRHL [6], a relational program logic that has been used for proving differential privacy of non-interactive algorithms, and incorporating aHL [11], a (non-relational) program logic for accuracy properties. We illustrate our approach through a single running example, which exemplifies the three classes of algorithms and explores new variants of the Sparse Vector technique, a well-studied algorithm from the privacy literature. We implement our logic in EasyCrypt, and formally verify privacy. We also introduce a novel coupling technique called optimal subset coupling that may be of independent interest.

langue originaleAnglais
titreCCS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
EditeurAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages55-67
Nombre de pages13
ISBN (Electronique)9781450341394
Les DOIs
étatPublié - 24 oct. 2016
Modification externeOui
Evénement23rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2016 - Vienna, Autriche
Durée: 24 oct. 201628 oct. 2016

Série de publications

NomProceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Volume24-28-October-2016
ISSN (imprimé)1543-7221

Une conférence

Une conférence23rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2016
Pays/TerritoireAutriche
La villeVienna
période24/10/1628/10/16

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