TY - GEN
T1 - Dissecting Bitcoin and Ethereum Transactions
T2 - 27th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2023
AU - Messias, Johnnatan
AU - Pahari, Vabuk
AU - Chandrasekaran, Balakrishnan
AU - Gummadi, Krishna P.
AU - Loiseau, Patrick
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024, The Author(s).
PY - 2024/1/1
Y1 - 2024/1/1
N2 - In permissionless blockchains, transaction issuers include a fee to incentivize miners to include their transactions. To accurately estimate this prioritization fee for a transaction, transaction issuers (or blockchain participants, [email protected] generally) rely on two fundamental notions of transparency, namely contention and prioritization transparency. Contention transparency implies that participants are aware of every pending transaction that will contend with a given transaction for inclusion. Prioritization transparency states that the participants are aware of the transaction or prioritization fees paid by every such contending transaction. Neither of these notions of transparency holds well today. Private relay networks, for instance, allow users to send transactions privately to miners. Besides, users can offer fees to miners via either direct transfers to miners’ wallets or off-chain payments—neither of which are public. In this work, we characterize the lack of contention and prioritization transparency in Bitcoin and Ethereum resulting from such practices. We show that private relay networks are widely used and private transactions are quite prevalent. We show that the lack of transparency facilitates miners to collude and overcharge users who may use these private relay networks despite them offering little to no guarantees on transaction prioritization. The lack of these transparencies in blockchains has crucial implications for transaction issuers as well as the stability of blockchains. Finally, we make our data sets and scripts publicly available.
AB - In permissionless blockchains, transaction issuers include a fee to incentivize miners to include their transactions. To accurately estimate this prioritization fee for a transaction, transaction issuers (or blockchain participants, [email protected] generally) rely on two fundamental notions of transparency, namely contention and prioritization transparency. Contention transparency implies that participants are aware of every pending transaction that will contend with a given transaction for inclusion. Prioritization transparency states that the participants are aware of the transaction or prioritization fees paid by every such contending transaction. Neither of these notions of transparency holds well today. Private relay networks, for instance, allow users to send transactions privately to miners. Besides, users can offer fees to miners via either direct transfers to miners’ wallets or off-chain payments—neither of which are public. In this work, we characterize the lack of contention and prioritization transparency in Bitcoin and Ethereum resulting from such practices. We show that private relay networks are widely used and private transactions are quite prevalent. We show that the lack of transparency facilitates miners to collude and overcharge users who may use these private relay networks despite them offering little to no guarantees on transaction prioritization. The lack of these transparencies in blockchains has crucial implications for transaction issuers as well as the stability of blockchains. Finally, we make our data sets and scripts publicly available.
KW - Bitcoin
KW - Contention transparency
KW - Ethereum
KW - MEV
KW - Prioritization transparency
KW - Private transactions
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85180637422
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-47751-5_13
DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-47751-5_13
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85180637422
SN - 9783031477508
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
SP - 221
EP - 240
BT - Financial Cryptography and Data Security - 27th International Conference, FC 2023, Revised Selected Papers
A2 - Baldimtsi, Foteini
A2 - Cachin, Christian
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Y2 - 1 May 2023 through 5 May 2023
ER -