Dissent in monetary policy decisions

Alessandro Riboni; Francisco Ruge-Murcia

doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.03.006

Dissent in monetary policy decisions

Alessandro Riboni
, Francisco Ruge-Murcia

McGill University

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal › Article › Revue par des pairs

Résumé

Voting records indicate that dissents in monetary policy committees are frequent and predictability regressions show that they help forecast future policy decisions. This paper develops a model of consensual collective decision-making and dissent, and estimates it using individual voting data from the Bank of England and the Riksbank. Regressions based on artificial data simulated from the model show that decision-making frictions help account for the predictive power of current dissents.

langue originale	Anglais
Pages (de - à)	137-154
Nombre de pages	18
journal	Journal of Monetary Economics
Volume	66
Les DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.03.006
état	Publié - 1 janv. 2014

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10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.03.006

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title = "Dissent in monetary policy decisions",

abstract = "Voting records indicate that dissents in monetary policy committees are frequent and predictability regressions show that they help forecast future policy decisions. This paper develops a model of consensual collective decision-making and dissent, and estimates it using individual voting data from the Bank of England and the Riksbank. Regressions based on artificial data simulated from the model show that decision-making frictions help account for the predictive power of current dissents.",

keywords = "Committees, Political economy of central banking, Supermajority, Voting models",

author = "Alessandro Riboni and Francisco Ruge-Murcia",

year = "2014",

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doi = "10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.03.006",

language = "English",

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AU - Riboni, Alessandro

AU - Ruge-Murcia, Francisco

PY - 2014/1/1

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N2 - Voting records indicate that dissents in monetary policy committees are frequent and predictability regressions show that they help forecast future policy decisions. This paper develops a model of consensual collective decision-making and dissent, and estimates it using individual voting data from the Bank of England and the Riksbank. Regressions based on artificial data simulated from the model show that decision-making frictions help account for the predictive power of current dissents.

AB - Voting records indicate that dissents in monetary policy committees are frequent and predictability regressions show that they help forecast future policy decisions. This paper develops a model of consensual collective decision-making and dissent, and estimates it using individual voting data from the Bank of England and the Riksbank. Regressions based on artificial data simulated from the model show that decision-making frictions help account for the predictive power of current dissents.

KW - Committees

KW - Political economy of central banking

KW - Supermajority

KW - Voting models

U2 - 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.03.006

DO - 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.03.006

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84905159485

SN - 0304-3932

VL - 66

SP - 137

EP - 154

JO - Journal of Monetary Economics

JF - Journal of Monetary Economics

ER -

Dissent in monetary policy decisions

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