Passer à la navigation principale Passer à la recherche Passer au contenu principal

F-BLEAU: Fast black-box leakage estimation

  • ENAC-IIC-GEL
  • University of Athens

Résultats de recherche: Le chapitre dans un livre, un rapport, une anthologie ou une collectionContribution à une conférenceRevue par des pairs

Résumé

We consider the problem of measuring how much a system reveals about its secret inputs. We work in the black-box setting: we assume no prior knowledge of the system's internals, and we run the system for choices of secrets and measure its leakage from the respective outputs. Our goal is to estimate the Bayes risk, from which one can derive some of the most popular leakage measures (e.g., min-entropy leakage). The state-of-the-art method for estimating these leakage measures is the frequentist paradigm, which approximates the system's internals by looking at the frequencies of its inputs and outputs. Unfortunately, this does not scale for systems with large output spaces, where it would require too many input-output examples. Consequently, it also cannot be applied to systems with continuous outputs (e.g., time side channels, network traffic). In this paper, we exploit an analogy between Machine Learning (ML) and black-box leakage estimation to show that the Bayes risk of a system can be estimated by using a class of ML methods: the universally consistent learning rules; these rules can exploit patterns in the input-output examples to improve the estimates' convergence, while retaining formal optimality guarantees. We focus on a set of them, the nearest neighbor rules; we show that they significantly reduce the number of black-box queries required for a precise estimation whenever nearby outputs tend to be produced by the same secret; furthermore, some of them can tackle systems with continuous outputs. We illustrate the applicability of these techniques on both synthetic and real-world data, and we compare them with the state-of-the-art tool, leakiEst, which is based on the frequentist approach.

langue originaleAnglais
titreProceedings - 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2019
EditeurInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages835-852
Nombre de pages18
ISBN (Electronique)9781538666609
Les DOIs
étatPublié - 1 mai 2019
Evénement40th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2019 - San Francisco, États-Unis
Durée: 19 mai 201923 mai 2019

Série de publications

NomProceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Volume2019-May
ISSN (imprimé)1081-6011

Une conférence

Une conférence40th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2019
Pays/TerritoireÉtats-Unis
La villeSan Francisco
période19/05/1923/05/19

Empreinte digitale

Examiner les sujets de recherche de « F-BLEAU: Fast black-box leakage estimation ». Ensemble, ils forment une empreinte digitale unique.

Contient cette citation