Geographic access markets and investments

Marc Bourreau; Carlo Cambini; Steffen Hoernig

doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2015.04.003

Geographic access markets and investments

Marc Bourreau
, Carlo Cambini
, Steffen Hoernig

ENSAE
Politecnico di Torino
Nova School of Business and Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Centre for Economic and Policy Research

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal › Article › Revue par des pairs

16 Citations (Scopus)

Résumé

We analyze the adoption of access regimes that differ according to the prevailing degree of infrastructure competition in different geographical areas of a country. Our results show that, compared to a uniform access price, geographically differentiated access prices improve welfare and incentivize investment. However, when access provision in areas with infrastructure competition is deregulated, welfare might decrease, because multiple inefficient equilibria at the wholesale level emerge, with either too little or too much investment.

langue originale	Anglais
Pages (de - à)	13-21
Nombre de pages	9
journal	Information Economics and Policy
Volume	31
Les DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2015.04.003
état	Publié - 1 juin 2015
Modification externe	Oui

SDG des Nations Unies

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SDG 9 Industrie, innovation et infrastructure

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10.1016/j.infoecopol.2015.04.003

Contient cette citation

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title = "Geographic access markets and investments",

abstract = "We analyze the adoption of access regimes that differ according to the prevailing degree of infrastructure competition in different geographical areas of a country. Our results show that, compared to a uniform access price, geographically differentiated access prices improve welfare and incentivize investment. However, when access provision in areas with infrastructure competition is deregulated, welfare might decrease, because multiple inefficient equilibria at the wholesale level emerge, with either too little or too much investment.",

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AU - Cambini, Carlo

AU - Hoernig, Steffen

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AB - We analyze the adoption of access regimes that differ according to the prevailing degree of infrastructure competition in different geographical areas of a country. Our results show that, compared to a uniform access price, geographically differentiated access prices improve welfare and incentivize investment. However, when access provision in areas with infrastructure competition is deregulated, welfare might decrease, because multiple inefficient equilibria at the wholesale level emerge, with either too little or too much investment.

KW - Geographical access regulation

KW - Infrastructure investment

KW - Wholesale competition

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DO - 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2015.04.003

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VL - 31

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JO - Information Economics and Policy

JF - Information Economics and Policy

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Geographic access markets and investments

Résumé

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