Legitimacy of mechanisms for public good provision

Pierre C. Boyer; Yukio Koriyama; Elisabeth Schulte

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.041

Legitimacy of mechanisms for public good provision

Pierre C. Boyer
, Yukio Koriyama
, Elisabeth Schulte

ENSAE
Philipps University of Marburg

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal › Article › Revue par des pairs

Résumé

We study a two-stage mechanism in a setting with asymmetric information about preferences for a public good. We view deliberation before the implementation of a mechanism as an opportunity to provide legitimacy of using the mechanism. We show that the d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) mechanism is incompatible with informative deliberation.

langue originale	Anglais
Pages (de - à)	120-122
Nombre de pages	3
journal	Economics Letters
Volume	146
Les DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.041
état	Publié - 1 sept. 2016
Modification externe	Oui

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10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.041

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title = "Legitimacy of mechanisms for public good provision",

abstract = "We study a two-stage mechanism in a setting with asymmetric information about preferences for a public good. We view deliberation before the implementation of a mechanism as an opportunity to provide legitimacy of using the mechanism. We show that the d'Aspremont and G{\'e}rard-Varet (1979) mechanism is incompatible with informative deliberation.",

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AU - Koriyama, Yukio

AU - Schulte, Elisabeth

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AB - We study a two-stage mechanism in a setting with asymmetric information about preferences for a public good. We view deliberation before the implementation of a mechanism as an opportunity to provide legitimacy of using the mechanism. We show that the d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) mechanism is incompatible with informative deliberation.

KW - Asymmetric information

KW - Deliberation

KW - Ex post efficiency

KW - Public good

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.041

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.041

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84982854583

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 146

SP - 120

EP - 122

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -

Legitimacy of mechanisms for public good provision

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