Optimal use of communication resources

Olivier Gossner; Penélope Hernández; Abraham Neyman

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00720.x

Optimal use of communication resources

Olivier Gossner
, Penélope Hernández
, Abraham Neyman

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal › Article › Revue par des pairs

Résumé

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.

langue originale	Anglais
Pages (de - à)	1603-1636
Nombre de pages	34
journal	Econometrica
Volume	74
Numéro de publication	6
Les DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00720.x
état	Publié - 1 nov. 2006

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10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00720.x

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title = "Optimal use of communication resources",

abstract = "We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.",

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AB - We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.

KW - Communication

KW - Entropy

KW - Iinformation processing

KW - Incomplete information

KW - Information economics

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/33750573083

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M3 - Article

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Optimal use of communication resources

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