TY - GEN
T1 - Revisiting the liquidity/risk trade-off with smart contracts
AU - Danos, Vincent
AU - Krivine, Jean
AU - Prat, Julien
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Vincent Danos, Jean Krivine, and Julien Prat; licensed under Creative Commons License CC-BY
PY - 2021/2/1
Y1 - 2021/2/1
N2 - Real-time financial settlements constrain traders to have the cash on hand before they can enter a trade [3]. This prevents short-selling and ultimately impedes liquidity. We propose a novel trading protocol which relaxes the cash constraint, and manages chains of deferred payments. Traders can buy without paying first, and can re-sell while still withholding payments. Trades naturally arrange in chains which contract when deals are closed and extend when new ones open. Default risk is handled by reversing trades. In this short note we propose a class of novel financial instruments for zero-risk and zero-collateral intermediation. The central idea is that bilateral trades can be chained into trade lines. The ownership of an underlying asset becomes distributed among traders with positions in the trade line. The trading protocol determines who ends up owning that asset and the overall payoffs of the participants. Counterparty risk is avoided because the asset itself serves as a collateral for the entire chain of trades. The protocol can be readily implemented as a smart contract on a blockchain. Additional examples, proofs, protocol variants, and game-theoretic properties related to the order-sensitivity of the games defined by trade lines can be found in the extended version of this note [1]. Therein, one can also find the definition and game-theoretic analysis of standard trade-lines with applications to trust-less zero-collateral intermediation.
AB - Real-time financial settlements constrain traders to have the cash on hand before they can enter a trade [3]. This prevents short-selling and ultimately impedes liquidity. We propose a novel trading protocol which relaxes the cash constraint, and manages chains of deferred payments. Traders can buy without paying first, and can re-sell while still withholding payments. Trades naturally arrange in chains which contract when deals are closed and extend when new ones open. Default risk is handled by reversing trades. In this short note we propose a class of novel financial instruments for zero-risk and zero-collateral intermediation. The central idea is that bilateral trades can be chained into trade lines. The ownership of an underlying asset becomes distributed among traders with positions in the trade line. The trading protocol determines who ends up owning that asset and the overall payoffs of the participants. Counterparty risk is avoided because the asset itself serves as a collateral for the entire chain of trades. The protocol can be readily implemented as a smart contract on a blockchain. Additional examples, proofs, protocol variants, and game-theoretic properties related to the order-sensitivity of the games defined by trade lines can be found in the extended version of this note [1]. Therein, one can also find the definition and game-theoretic analysis of standard trade-lines with applications to trust-less zero-collateral intermediation.
KW - Electronic trading
KW - Smart contracts
KW - Static analysis
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85115846438
U2 - 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.10
DO - 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.10
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85115846438
T3 - OpenAccess Series in Informatics
BT - 2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols, Tokenomics 2020
A2 - Anceaume, Emmanuelle
A2 - Bisiere, Christophe
A2 - Bouvard, Matthieu
A2 - Bramas, Quentin
A2 - Casamatta, Catherine
PB - Schloss Dagstuhl- Leibniz-Zentrum fur Informatik GmbH, Dagstuhl Publishing
T2 - 2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols, Tokenomics 2020
Y2 - 26 October 2020 through 27 October 2020
ER -