Secret correlation in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

Olivier Gossner; Tristan Tomala

doi:10.1287/moor.1060.0248

Secret correlation in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

Olivier Gossner
, Tristan Tomala

Northwestern University
Université Paris Dauphine

Résultats de recherche: Contribution à un journal › Article › Revue par des pairs

28 Citations (Scopus)

Résumé

We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal tradeoff for the team between optimization of stage payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation.

langue originale	Anglais
Pages (de - à)	413-424
Nombre de pages	12
journal	Mathematics of Operations Research
Volume	32
Numéro de publication	2
Les DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1060.0248
état	Publié - 1 janv. 2007

Accès au document

10.1287/moor.1060.0248

Contient cette citation

@article{8d8df5ca490c4951803e35eb237784af,

title = "Secret correlation in repeated games with imperfect monitoring",

abstract = "We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal tradeoff for the team between optimization of stage payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation.",

keywords = "Entropy, Min-max values, Repeated games, Secret correlation, Signals, Stochastic process",

author = "Olivier Gossner and Tristan Tomala",

year = "2007",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1287/moor.1060.0248",

language = "English",

volume = "32",

pages = "413--424",

journal = "Mathematics of Operations Research",

issn = "0364-765X",

publisher = "INFORMS Inst.for Operations Res.and the Management Sciences",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Secret correlation in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

AU - Gossner, Olivier

AU - Tomala, Tristan

PY - 2007/1/1

Y1 - 2007/1/1

N2 - We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal tradeoff for the team between optimization of stage payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation.

AB - We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal tradeoff for the team between optimization of stage payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation.

KW - Entropy

KW - Min-max values

KW - Repeated games

KW - Secret correlation

KW - Signals

KW - Stochastic process

U2 - 10.1287/moor.1060.0248

DO - 10.1287/moor.1060.0248

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:38549109645

SN - 0364-765X

VL - 32

SP - 413

EP - 424

JO - Mathematics of Operations Research

JF - Mathematics of Operations Research

IS - 2

ER -

Secret correlation in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

Résumé

Accès au document

Empreinte digitale

Contient cette citation